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ABSTRACT
The success of deep learning partially benefits from the availability
of various large-scale datasets. These datasets are often crowd-
sourced from individual users and contain private information like
gender, age, etc. The emerging privacy concerns from users on data
sharing hinder the generation or use of crowdsourcing datasets
and lead to hunger of training data for new deep learning applica-
tions. One naïve solution is to pre-process the raw data to extract
features at the user-side, and then only the extracted features will
be sent to the data collector. Unfortunately, attackers can still ex-
ploit these extracted features to train an adversary classifier to
infer private attributes. Some prior arts leveraged game theory to
protect private attributes. However, these defenses are designed
for known primary learning tasks, the extracted features work
poorly for unknown learning tasks. To tackle the case where the
learning task may be unknown or changing, we present TIPRDC,
a task-independent privacy-respecting data crowdsourcing frame-
work with anonymized intermediate representation. The goal of
this framework is to learn a feature extractor that can hide the
privacy information from the intermediate representations; while
maximally retaining the original information embedded in the raw
data for the data collector to accomplish unknown learning tasks.
We design a hybrid training method to learn the anonymized in-
termediate representation: (1) an adversarial training process for
hiding private information from features; (2) maximally retain origi-
nal information using a neural-network-based mutual information
estimator. We extensively evaluate TIPRDC and compare it with ex-
isting methods using two image datasets and one text dataset. Our
results show that TIPRDC substantially outperforms other existing
methods. Our work is the first task-independent privacy-respecting
data crowdsourcing framework.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy; • Computing methodologies → Ma-
chine learning;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has demonstrated an impressive performance in
many applications, such as computer vision [13, 17] and natural
language processing [2, 28, 40]. Such success of deep learning par-
tially benefits from various large-scale datasets (e.g., ImageNet [5],
MS-COCO [21], etc.), which can be used to train powerful deep
neural networks (DNN). The datasets are often crowdsourced from
individual users to train DNN models. For example, companies or
research institutes that want to implement face recognition sys-
tems may collect the facial images from employees or volunteers.
However, those data that are crowdsourced from individual users
for deep learning applications often contain private information
such as gender, age, etc. Unfortunately, the data crowdsourcing
process can be exposed to serious privacy risks as the data may be
misused by the data collector or acquired by the adversary. It is
recently reported that many large companies face data security and
user privacy challenges. The data breach of Facebook, for example,
raises usersâĂŹ severe concerns on sharing their personal data.
These emerging privacy concerns hinder generation or use of large-
scale crowdsourcing datasets and lead to hunger of training data
of many new deep learning applications. A number of countries
are also establishing laws to protect data security and privacy. As a
famous example, the new European Union’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) requires companies to not store personal
data for a long time, and allows users to delete or withdraw their
personal data within 30 days. It is critical to design a data crowd-
sourcing framework to protect the privacy of the shared data while
maintaining the utility for training DNN models.
Existing solutions to protect privacy are struggling to balance
the tradeoff between privacy and utility. An obvious and widely
adopted solution is to transform the raw data into task-oriented fea-
tures, and users only upload the extracted features to corresponding
service providers, such as Google Now [12] and Google Cloud [11].
Even though transmitting only features are generally more secure
than uploading raw data, recent developments in model inversion
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attacks [6, 7, 24] have demonstrated that adversaries can exploit the
acquired features to reconstruct the raw image, and hence the per-
son on the raw image can be re-identified from the reconstructed
image. In addition, the extracted features can also be exploited by an
adversary to infer private attributes, such as gender, age, etc. Ossia
et al. [29] move forward by applying dimentionality reduction and
noise injection to the features before uploading them to the service
provider. However, such approach leads to unignorable utility loss.
Inspired by Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), several adver-
sarial learning approaches [15, 19, 22, 27] have been proposed to
learn obfuscated features from raw images. Unfortunately, those so-
lutions are designed for known primary learning tasks, which limits
their applicability in the data crowdsourcing where the primary
learning task may be unknown or changed when training a DNN
model. The need of collecting large-scale crowdsourcing dataset
under strict requirement of data privacy and limited applicability
of existing solutions motivates us to design a privacy-respecting
data crowdsourcing framework: the raw data from the users are
locally transformed into an intermediate representation that can
remove the private information while retaining the discriminative
features for primary learning tasks.
In this work, we propose TIPRDC – a task-independent privacy-
respecting data crowdsourcing framework with anonymized in-
termediate representation. The ultimate goal of this framework
is to learn a feature extractor that can remove the privacy infor-
mation from the extracted intermediate features while maximally
retaining the original information embedded in the raw data for
primary learning tasks. As Figure 1 shows, participants can locally
run the feature extractor and submit only those intermediate rep-
resentations to the data collector instead of submitting the raw
data. The data collector then trains DNN models using these col-
lected intermediate representations, but both the data collector
and the adversary cannot accurately infer any protected private
information. Compared with existing adversarial learning methods
[15, 19, 22, 27], TIPRDC does not require the knowledge of the pri-
mary learning task and hence, directly applying existing adversarial
training methods becomes impractical. It is challenging to remove
all concerned private information that needs to be protected while
retaining everything else for unknown primary learning tasks. To
address this issue, we design a hybrid learning method to learn the
anonymized intermediate representation. The learning purpose is
two-folded: (1) hiding private information from features; (2) maxi-
mally retaining original information. Specifically, we hide private
information from features by performing our proposed privacy
adversarial training (PAT) algorithm, which simulates the game
between an adversary who makes efforts to infer private attributes
from the extracted features and a defender who aims to protect
user privacy. The original information are retained by applying our
proposed MaxMI algorithm, which aims to maximize the mutual
information between the feature of the raw data and the union of
the private information and the retained feature.
In summary, our key contributions are the follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, TIPRDC is the first privacy-
respecting data crowdsourcing framework for deep learning
without the knowledge of any specific primary learning task.
By applying TIPRDC, the learned feature extractor can hide
private information from features while maximally retaining
the information of the raw data.
• We propose a privacy adversarial training algorithm to en-
able the feature extractor to hide privacy information from
features. In addition, we also design the MaxMI algorithm
to maximize the mutual information between the raw data
and the union of the private information and the retained
feature, so that the original information from the raw data
can be maximally retained in the feature.
• We quantitatively evaluate the utility-privacy tradeoff with
applying TIPRDC on three real-world datasets, including
both image and text data. We also compare the performance
of TIPRDC with existing solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related work. Section 3 presents the problem formulation. Sec-
tion 4 describes the framework overview and details of coremodules.
Section 5 evaluates the framework. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Data Privacy Protection: Many techniques have been proposed to
protect data privacy, most of which are based on various anonymiza-
tion methods including k-anonymity [36], l-diversity [24] and t-
closeness [20]. However, these approaches are designed for pro-
tecting sensitive attributes in a static database and hence, are not
suitable to our addressed problem – data privacy protection in the
online data crowdsourcing for training DNN models. Differential
privacy [1, 3, 8, 9, 33, 34, 38] is another widely applied technique
to protect privacy of an individual’s data record, which provides
a strong privacy guarantee. However, the privacy guarantee pro-
vided by differential privacy is different from the privacy protection
offered by TIPRDC in data crowdsourcing. The goal of differen-
tial privacy is to add random noise to a userâĂŹs true data record
such that two arbitrary true data records have close probabilities
to generate the same noisy data record. Compared with differential
privacy, our goal is to hide private information from the features
such that an adversary cannot accurately infer the protected private
information through training DNN models. Osia et al. [29] lever-
age a combination of dimensionality reduction, noise addition, and
Siamese fine-tuning to protect sensitive information from features,
but it does not offer the tradeoff between privacy and utility in a
systematic way.
Visual Privacy Protection: Some works have been done to
specifically preserve privacy in images and videos. De-identification
is a typical privacy-preserving visual recognition approach to alter
the raw image such that the identity cannot be visually recog-
nized. There are various techniques to achieve de-identification,
such as Gaussian blur [26], identity obfuscation [26], mean shift
filtering [39] and adversarial image perturbation [27]. Although
those approaches are effective in protecting visual privacy, they
all limit the utility of the data for training DNN models. In addi-
tion, encryption-based approaches [10, 42] have been proposed
to guarantee the privacy of the data, but they require specialized
DNN models to directly train on the encrypted data. Unfortunately,
such encryption-based solutions prevent general dataset release
and introduce substantial computational overhead. All the above
practices only consider protecting privacy in specific data format,
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Figure 1: The overview of TIPRDC.
i.e., image and video, which limit their applicability across diverse
data modalities in the real world.
Tradeoff between Privacy and Utility using Adversarial
Networks: With recent advances in deep learning, several ap-
proaches have been proposed to protect data privacy using ad-
versarial networks and simulate the game between the attacker and
the defender who defend each other with conflicting utility-privacy
goals. Pittaluga et al. [32] design an adversarial learning method
for learning an encoding function to defend against performing
inference for specific attributes from the encoded features. Seong
et al. [27] introduce an adversarial network to obfuscate the raw
image so that the attacker cannot successfully perform image recog-
nition. Wu et al. [41] design an adversarial framework to explicitly
learn a degradation transform for the original video inputs, aiming
to balance between target task performance and the associated
privacy budgets on the degraded video. Li et al. [19] and Liu et al.
[22] propose approaches to learn obfuscated features using adver-
sarial networks, and only obfuscated features will be submitted
to the service provider for performing inference. Attacker cannot
train an adversary classifier using collected obfuscated features
to accurately infer a user’s private attributes or reconstruct the
raw data. The same idea behind the above solutions is that using
adversarial networks to obfuscate the raw data or features, in order
to defending against privacy leakage. However, those solutions
are designed to protect privacy information while targeting some
specified learning tasks, such as face recognition, activity recogni-
tion, etc. Our proposed TIPRDC provides a more general privacy
protection, which does not require the knowledge of the primary
learning task.
Differences between TIPRDC and existing methods: Com-
pared with prior arts, our proposed TIPRDC has two distinguished
features: (1) a more general approach that be applied on different
data formats instead of handling only image data or static database;
(2) require no knowledge of primary learning tasks.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
There are three parties involved in the crowdsourcing process:
user, adversary, and data collector. Under the strict requirement
of data privacy, a data collector offers options to a user to specify
any private attribute that needs to be protected. Here we denote
the private attribute specified by a user as u. According to the
requirement of protecting u, the data collector will learn a feature
extractor fθ (z |x ,u) that is parameterized by weight θ , which is the
Figure 2: Optimal outcome of feature extractor fθ (z |x ,u).
core of TIPRDC. The data collector distributes the data collecting
request associated with the feature extractor to users. Given the
raw data x provided by a user, the feature extractor can locally
extract feature z from x while hiding private attribute u. Then, only
extracted feature z will be shared with the data collector, which can
training DNN models for primary learning tasks using collected z.
An adversary, who may be an authorized internal staff of the data
collector or an external hacker, has access to the extracted feature
z and aims to infer private attribute u based on z. We assume an
adversary can train a DNN model via collecting z, and then the
trained model takes a user’s extracted feature z as input and infers
the user’s private attribute u.
The critical challenge of TIPRDC is to learn the feature extractor,
which can hide private attribute from features while maximally
retaining original information from the raw data. Note that it is very
likely that the data and private attribute are somehow correlated.
Therefore, we cannot guarantee no information about u will be
contained in z unless we enforce it in the objective function when
training the feature extractor.
The ultimate goal of the feature extractor f is two-folded:
• Goal 1:make sure the extracted features conveys no private
attribute;
• Goal 2: retain as much information of the raw data as possi-
ble to maintain the utility for primary learning tasks.
Formally, Goal 1 can be formulated as:
min
θ
I (z;u). (1)
On the other hand, Goal 2 can be formulated as:
max
θ
I (x ; z |u). (2)
In order to avoid any potential conflict with the objective of Goal
1, we need to mitigate counting in the information where u and x
are correlated. Therefore, the mutual information in Equation 2 is
evaluated under the condition of private attribute u. Note that
I (x ; z |u) = I (x ; z,u) − I (x ;u). (3)
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Since both x and u are considered fixed under our setting, I (x ;u)
will stay as a constant during the optimization process of feature
extractor fθ . Therefore, we can safely rewrite the objective of Goal
2 as:
max
θ
I (x ; z,u), (4)
which is to maximize the mutual information between x and joint
distribution of z and u.
As Figure 2 illustrates, we provide an intuitive demonstration of
the optimal outcome of the feature extractor using a Venn diagram.
Goal 1 is fulfilled as no overlap exist between z (green area) and u
(orange area); and Goal 2 is achieved as z and u jointly (all colored
regions) cover all the information of x (blue circle).
It is widely accepted in the previous works that precisely calcu-
lating the mutual information between two arbitrary distributions
are likely to be infeasible [31]. As a result, we replace the mutual
information objectives in Equation 1 and 4 with their upper and
lower bounds for effective optimization. For Goal 1, we utilize the
mutual information upper bound derived in [35] as:
I (z;u) ≤ Eqθ (z)DKL(qθ (u |z)| |p(u)), (5)
for any distribution p(u). Note that the term qθ (u |z) in Equation (5)
is hard to estimate and hence we instead replace the KL divergence
term with its lower bound by introducing a conditional distribution
pΨ(u |z) parameterized with Ψ. It was shown in [35] that:
Eqθ (z,u) [logpΨ(u |z) − logp(u)]
≤ Eqθ (z)DKL(qθ (u |z)| |p(u)) (6)
Hence, the Equation 1 can be rewritten as an adversarial training
objective function:
min
θ
max
Ψ
Eqθ (z,u) [logpΨ(u |z) − logp(u)] , (7)
or alternatively:
max
θ
min
Ψ
CE [pΨ(u |z)] , (8)
where CE [·] stands for the cross entropy loss of predicting u with
z. This objective function can be interpreted as an adversarial game
between an adversary pΨ who tries to infer u from z and a defender
qθ who aims to protect the user privacy.
For Goal 2, we adopt the previously proposed Jensen-Shannon
mutual information estimator [14, 25] to estimate the lower bound
of the mutual information I(x; z,u). The lower bound is formulated
as follows:
I(x ; z,u) ≥ I(JSD)θ,ω (x ; z,u)
:= −sp(−Dω (x ; fθ (x),u)) − sp(Dω (x ′; fθ (x),u)), (9)
where x ′ is an random input data sampled independently from the
same distribution ofx , sp(z) = loд(1+ez ) is the softplus function and
Dω is a discriminator modeled by a neural network with parameters
ω. Hence, to maximally retain the original information, the feature
extractor and the mutual information estimator can be optimized
using Equation 10:
max
θ
max
ω
I(JSD)θ,ω (x ; z,u). (10)
Finally, combining Equation 8 and 10, the objective function of
training the feature extractor can be formulated as:
max
θ
(λ min
Ψ
CE [pΨ(u |z)] + (1 − λ)maxω I
(JSD)
θ,ω (x ; z,u)), (11)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] serves as a utility-privacy budget. A larger λ
indicates a stronger privacy protection, while a smaller λ allowing
more original information to be retained in the extracted features.
4 DESIGN OF TIPRDC
4.1 Overview
The critical module of TIPRDC is the feature extractor. As presented
in Section 3, there are two goals for learning the feature extractor,
such that it can hide private attribute from features while retaining
as much information of the raw data as possible to maintain the
utility for primary learning task. To this end, we design a hybrid
learning method to train the feature extractor, including the privacy
adversarial training (PAT) algorithm and the MaxMI algorithm.
In particular, we design the PAT algorithm, which simulates the
game between an adversary who makes efforts to infer private
attributes from the extracted features and a defender who aims
to protect user privacy. By applying PAT to optimize the feature
extractor, we enforce the feature extractor to hide private attribute
u from extracted features z, which is goal 1 introduced in Section 3.
Additionally, we propose the MaxMI algorithm to achieve goal 2
presented in Section 3. By performing MaxMI to train the feature
extractor, we can enable the feature extractor to maximize the
mutual information between the information of the raw data x and
the joint information of the private attribute u and the extracted
feature z.
As Figure 3 shows, there are three neural network modules in
the hybrid learning method: feature extractor, adversarial classifier
and mutual information estimator. The feature extractor is the one
we aim to learn by performing the proposed hybrid learning al-
gorithm. The adversarial classifier simulates an adversary in the
PAT algorithm, aiming to infer private attribute u from the eaves-
dropped features. The mutual information estimator is adopted in
MaxMI algorithm to measure the mutual information between the
raw data x and the joint distribution of the private attribute u and
the extracted feature z. All three modules are end-to-end trained
using our proposed hybrid learning method.
Figure 3: The hybrid learning method for training the fea-
ture extractor.
TIPRDC: Task-Independent Privacy-Respecting Data Crowdsourcing Framework with Anonymized Intermediate RepresentationsConference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Before presenting the details of each algorithm, we give the
following notations. As same as presented in Section 3, we adopt
x , u and z as the raw data, the private attribute and the extracted
feature, respectively. We denote Eθ as the feature extractor that is
parameterized with θ , and then z can be expressed as Eθ (x). Let
EΨ represent the classifier, where Ψ indicates the parameter set
of the classifier. We adopt y = EΨ(Eθ (x)) to denote the prediction
generated by EΨ . Let Eω denotes the mutual information estimator,
where ω represents the parameter set of the mutual information
estimator.
4.2 Privacy Adversarial Training Algorithm
We design the PAT algorithm to achieve goal 1, enabling the feature
extractor to hide u from Eθ (x). The PAT algorithm is designed by
simulating the game between an adversary who makes efforts to in-
fer private attributes from the extracted features and a defender who
aims to protect user privacy. We can apply any architecture to both
the feature extractor and the classifier based on the requirement of
data format and the primary learning task. The performance of the
classifier (C) is measured using the cross-entropy loss function as:
L(C) = CE(y,u) = CE(EΨ(Eθ (x),u), (12)
where CE [·] stands for the cross entropy loss function. When we
simulate an adversary who tries to enhance the accuracy of the
adversary classifier as high as possible, the classifier needs to be
optimized by minimizing the above loss function as:
Ψ = arg min
Ψ
L(C). (13)
On the contrary, when defending against private attribute leakage,
we train the feature extractor in PAT that aims to degrade the
performance of the classifier. Consequently, the feature extractor
can be trained using Equation 14 when simulating a defender:
θ = arg max
θ
L(C). (14)
Based on Equation 13 and 14, the feature extractor and the classifier
can be jointly optimized using Equation 15:
θ ,Ψ = arg max
θ
min
Ψ
L(C), (15)
which is consistent with Equation 8.
4.3 MaxMI Algorithm
For goal 2, we propose MaxMI algorithm to make the feature extrac-
tor retain as much as information from the raw data as possible, in
order to maintain the high utility of the extracted features. Specifi-
cally, the Jensen-Shannon mutual information estimator [14, 25]
is adopted to measure the lower bound of the mutual information
I (x ; z,u). Here we adopt Eω as the the Jensen-Shannon mutual
information estimator, and we can rewrite Equation 9 as:
I(x ; z,u) ≥ I(JSD)θ,ω (x ; z,u)
:= −sp(−Eω (x ,Eθ (x),u)) − sp(Eω (x ′,Eθ (x),u)), (16)
where x ′ is an random input data sampled independently from the
same distribution of x , sp(z) = loд(1 + ez ) is the softplus function.
Hence, to maximally retain the original information, the feature
extractor and the mutual information estimator can be optimized
using Equation 17:
θ ,ω = arg max
θ
max
ω
I(JSD)θ,ω (x ; z,u), (17)
which is consistent with Equation 10. Considering the difference
of x , z and u in dimensionality, we feed them into the Eω from
different layers as illustrated in Figure 3. For example, the private
attribute u may be a binary label, which is represented by one bit.
However, x may be high dimensional data (e.g., image), and hence
it is not reasonable feed both x and u from the first layer of Eω .
4.4 Hybrid Learning Method
Finally, the feature extractor is trained by alternatively perform-
ing PAT algorithm and MaxMI algorithm. As aforementioned, we
also introduce an utility-privacy budget λ to balance the tradeoff
between protecting privacy and retaining the original information.
Therefore, combining Equation 15 and 17, the objective function of
training the feature extractor can be formulated as:
θ ,Ψ,ω = arg max
θ
(λ min
Ψ
L(C) + (1 − λ)max
ω
I(JSD)θ,ω (x ; z,u)). (18)
Algorithm 1 summarizes the hybrid learning method of TIPRDC.
Before performing the hybrid learning, we first jointly pretrain the
feature extractor and the adversarial classifier normally without
adversarial objective to obtain the best performance on classifying
a specific private attribute. Then within each training batch, we first
perform PAT algorithm and MaxMI algorithm to update Ψ and ω,
respectively. Then, the feature extractor will be updated according
to Equation 18.
Algorithm 1 Hybrid Learning Method
Input: Dataset D
Output: θ
1: for every epoch do
2: for every batch do
3: L(C) → updateψ (performing PAT)
4: −I JSDθ,ω (x ; z,u) → update ω (performing MaxMI)
5: −λL(C) − (1 − λ)I JSDθ,ω (x ; z,u) → update θ
6: end for
7: end for
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate TIPRDC’s performance on three real-
world datasets, with a focus on the utility-privacy tradeoff. We also
compare TIPRDC with existing solutions proposed in the literature
and visualize the results.
5.1 Experiment Setup
We evaluate TIPRDC, especially the learned feature extractor, on
two image datasets and one text dataset. We implement TIPRDC
with PyTorch, and train it on a server with 4×NVIDIA TITAN RTX
GPUs. We apply mini-batch technique in training with a batch size
of 64, and adopt the AdamOptimizer [16] with an adaptive learning
rate in the hybrid learning procedure. The architecture configura-
tions of each module are presented in Table 1 and 2. For evaluating
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the performance, given a primary learning task, a simulated data
collector trains a normal classifier using features processed by the
learned feature extractor, and such normal classifier has the same
architecture of the classifier presented in Table 1 and 2. The util-
ity and privacy of the extracted features Eθ (x) are evaluated by
the classification accuracy of primary learning tasks and specified
private attribute, respectively.
We adopt CelebA [23], LFW [18] and the dialectal tweets dataset
(DIAL) [4] for the training and testing of TIPRDC. CelebA consists
of more than 200K face images. Each face image is labeled with 40
binary facial attributes. The dataset is split into 160K images for
training and 40K images for testing. LFW consists of more than
13K face images, and each face image is labeled with 16 binary
facial attributes. We split LFW into 10K images for training and 3K
images for testing. DIAL consists of 59.2 million tweets collected
from 2.8 million users, and each tweet is annotated with three
binary attributes. DIAL is split into 48 million tweets for training
and 11.2 million tweets for testing.
Table 1: The architecture configurations of each module for
CelebA and LFW.
Feature Extractor Classifier MI Estimator
2×conv3-64 3×conv3-256 3×conv3-64
maxpool maxpool maxpool
2×conv3-128 3×conv3-512 2×conv3-128
maxpool maxpool maxpool
3×conv3-512 3×conv3-256
maxpool maxpool
2×fc-4096 3×conv3-512
fc-label length maxpool
3×conv3-512
maxpool
fc-4096
fc-512
fc-1
Table 2: The architecture configurations of each module for
DIAL.
Feature Extractor Classifier MI Estimator
embedding-300 2×lstm-300 embedding-300
lstm-300 fc-150 lstm-300
fc-label length 2×lstm-300
fc-150
fc-1
5.2 Comparison Baselines
We select four types of data privacy-preserving baselines [22],
which have been widely applied in the literature, and compare
them with TIPRDC. The details settings of the baseline solutions
are presented as below.
• Noisy method perturbs the raw data x by adding Gaussian
noise N(0,σ 2), where σ is set to 40 according to [22]. The
noisy data x¯ will be delivered to the data collector. The Gauss-
ian noise injected to the raw data can provide strong guaran-
tees of differential privacy using less local noise. This scheme
has been widely applied in federated learning [30, 37].
• DP approach injects Laplace noise the raw data x with di-
verse privacy budgets {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.9}, which is a typical
differential privacy method. The noisy data x¯ will be submit-
ted to the data collector.
• Encoder learns the latent representation of the raw data x
using a DNN-based encoder. The extracted features z will be
uploaded to the data collector.
• Hybridmethod further perturbs the above encoded features
by performing principle components analysis (PCA) and
adding Laplace noise [29] with varying noise factors privacy
budgets {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.9}.
5.3 Evaluations on CelebA and LFW
Comparison of utility-privacy tradeoff:We compare the utility-
privacy tradeoff offered by TIPRDC with four privacy-preserving
baselines. In our experiments, we set ‘young’ and ‘gender’ as the
private labels to protect in CelebA, and consider detecting ‘gray
hair’ and ‘smiling’ as the primary learning tasks to evaluate the
utility. With regard to LFW, we set ‘gender’ and ‘Asian’ as the
private labels, and choose recognizing ‘black hair’ and ‘eyeglass’
as the classification tasks. Figure 4 summarizes the utility-privacy
tradeoff offered by four baselines and TIPRDC. Here we evaluate
TIPRDC with four discrete choices of λ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0}.
As Figure 4 shows, although TIPRDC cannot always outperform
the baselines in both utility and privacy, it still achieve the best
utility-privacy tradeoff under most experiment settings. For exam-
ple, in Figure 4 (h), TIPRDC achieves the best tradeoff by setting
λ = 0.9. Specifically, the classification accuracy of ‘Asian’ on LFW is
55.31%, and the accuracy of ‘eyeglass’ is 86.88%. This demonstrates
that TIPRDC can efficiently protect privacy while maintaining high
utility of extracted features.
In other four baselines, Encoder method can maintain a good
utility of the extracted features, but it fails to protect privacy due
to the high accuracy of private labels achieved by the adversary.
Noisy, DP and Hybrid methods offer strong privacy protection with
sacrificing the utility.
Impact of the utility-privacy budget λ: An important step in
the hybrid learning procedure (see Equation 18) is to determine the
utility-privacy budget λ. To determine the optimal λ, we evaluate
the utility-privacy tradeoff on CelebA and LFW by setting different
λ. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of λwith four discrete choices
of λ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0}. The private labels and primary learning tasks
in CelebA and LFW are set as same as the above experiments.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the classification accuracy of primary
learning tasks will increase with a smaller λ, but the privacy pro-
tection will be weakened. Such phenomenon is reasonable, since
the smaller λ means hiding less privacy information in features but
retaining more original information from the raw data according
to Equation 18. For example, in Figure 5 (a), the classification ac-
curacy of ‘gray hair’ on CelebA is 84.36% with λ = 1 and increases
to 91.52% by setting λ = 0; the classification accuracy of ‘young’
is 65.63% and 81.85% with decreasing λ from 1 to 0, respectively.
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Figure 4: Utility-privacy tradeoff comparison of TIPRDC with four baselines on CelebA and LFW.
Overall, λ = 0.9 is an optimal utility-privacy budget for experiment
settings in both CelebA and LFW.
We further visualize how different options of λ influence the
utility maintained by the learned feature extractor. This is done
by training a decoder with the reversed architecture of the feature
extractor, and then the decoder aims to reconstruct the raw data
by taking the extracted feature as input. Here we adopt the setting
in Figure 5(b) as an example, where ‘gender’ is protected when
training the feature extractor. As Figure 6 shows, increasing λ allows
a more informative image to be reconstructed. This means more
information is retained in the extracted feature with a larger λ,
which is consist with the results shown in Figure 5(c).
Additionally, if we compare Figure 5(c) vs. Figure 5(a-b) and Fig-
ure 5(f) vs. Figure 5(d-e), it can be observed that protecting more
private attributes leads to slight degradation in utility with slightly
enhanced privacy protection under a particular λ. For example,
given λ = 0.9, the accuracy of ‘smiling’ slightly decreases from
90.13% in Figure 5(a) and 89.33% in Figure 5(b) to 88.16%. The ac-
curacy of ‘young’ slightly decreases from 65.77% in Figure 5(a) to
64.85% in Figure 5(c). The reason is that the feature related to the pri-
vate attributes has some intrinsic correlations to the feature related
to the primary learning tasks. Therefore, more correlated features
may be hidden if more private attributes need to be protected.
Effectiveness of privacy protection:We quantitatively eval-
uate the effectiveness of privacy protection offered by TIPRDC
by simulating an adversary to infer the private attribute through
training a classifier. As presented in Table 1, we adopt a default
architecture for simulating the adversary’s classifier. However, an
adversary may train the classifier with different architectures. We
implement three additional classifiers as an adversary in our ex-
periments. The architectural configurations of those classifiers are
presented in Table 3. We train those classifiers on CelebA by con-
sidering recognizing ‘smiling’ as the primary learning task, and
‘gender’ as the private attribute that needs to be protected. Table 4
presents the average classification accuracy for adversary classifiers
on testing data. The results show that although we apply a default
architecture for simulating the adversary classifier when training
the feature extractor, the trained feature extractor can effectively
defend against privacy leakage no matter what kinds of architecture
are adopted by an adversary in the classifier design.
Table 3: The ablation study with different architecture con-
figurations of the adversary classifier.
V-CL#16 V-CL#19 Res-CL
Input Feature Maps (54 × 44 × 128)
3×conv3-256
maxpool
4×conv3-256
maxpool
[
3 × 3(2), 128
3 × 3, 128
]
[
3 × 3, 128
3 × 3, 128
]
3×conv3-512
maxpool
4×conv3-512
maxpool
[
3 × 3, 256
3 × 3, 256
]
× 2
3×conv3-512
maxpool
4×conv3-512
maxpool
[
3 × 3, 512
3 × 3, 512
]
× 2
2×fc-4096
fc-label length
avgpool
fc-label length
Table 4: The classification accuracy of ‘gender’ on CelebA
with different adversary classifiers (λ = 0.9).
Training Classifier Adversary ClassifierDefault architecture in Table 1 V-CL#16 V-CL#19 Res-CL
Default architecture in Table 1 59.02% 59.83% 60.77% 61.05%
Evaluate the transferability of TIPRDC: The data collector
usually trains the feature extractor of TIPRDC before collecting the
data from users. Hence, the transferability of the feature extractor
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Figure 5: The impact of the utility-privacy budget λ on CelebA and LFW.
(a) raw image (b) λ = 1 (c) λ = 0.9 (d) λ = 0.5 (e) λ = 0
Figure 6: Visualize the impact of the utility-privacy budget
λ when protecting ‘gender’ in CelebA.
determines the usability of TIPRDC. We evaluate the transferability
of TIPRDC by performing cross-dataset evaluations. Specifically, we
train the feature extractor of TIPRDC using either CelebA or LFW
dataset and test the utility-privacy tradeoff on the other dataset. In
this experiment, we choose recognizing ‘black hair’ as the primary
learning task, and ‘gender’ as the private attribute that needs to
be protected. As Table 5 illustrates, the feature extractor that is
trained using one dataset can still effectively defend against private
attribute leakage on the other dataset, while maintaining the classi-
fication accuracy of the primary learning task. For example, if we
train the feature extractor using CelebA and then test it on LFW, the
accuracy of ’gender’ decreases to 56.87% compared with 57.31% by
directly training the feature extractor using LFW. The accuracy of
’black hair’ marginally increases to 89.27% from 88.121%. The reason
is that CelebA offers a larger number of training data so that the
feature extractor can be trained for a better performance. Although
there is a marginal performance drop, the feature extractor that is
trained using LFW still works well on CelebA. The cross-dataset
evaluations demonstrate good transferability of TIPRDC.
Table 5: Evaluate the transferability of TIPRDC with cross-
dataset experiments (λ = 0.9).
Test Dataset Training Dataset ‘gender’ ‘black hair’
LFW CelebA 59.73% 87.15%
LFW LFW 57.31% 88.12%
CelebA LFW 56.87% 89.27%
CelebA CelebA 58.82% 88.98%
5.4 Evaluation on DIAL
To quantitatively evaluate the utility-privacy tradeoff of TIPRDC
on DIAl, we choose ‘race’ as the private attribute that needs to
be protected and predicting ‘mentioned’ as the primary learning
task. The binary mention task is to determine if a tweet mentions
another user, i.e., classifying conversational vs. non-conversational
tweets. Similar to the experiment settings in CelebA and LFW, we
evaluate the utility-privacy tradeoff on DIAL by setting different λ
with four discrete choices of λ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0}.
As Figure 7 shows, the classification accuracy of primary learning
tasks will increase with a smaller λ, but the privacy protection will
be weakened, showing the same phenomenon as the evaluations
on CelebA and LFW. For example, the classification accuracy of
‘mentioned’ is 67.71% with λ = 1 and increases to 76.87% by setting
λ = 0, and the classification accuracy of ‘race’ increases by 21.57%
after changing λ from 1 to 0.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed a task-independent privacy-respecting data crowd-
sourcing framework TIPRDC. A feature extractor is learned to hide
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Figure 7: The impact of the utility-privacy budget λ onDIAL.
privacy information features and maximally retain original infor-
mation from the raw data. By applying TIPRDC, a user can locally
extract features from the raw data using the learned feature ex-
tractor, and the data collector will acquire the extracted features
only to train a DNN model for the primary learning tasks. Evalu-
ations on three benchmark datasets show that TIPRDC attains a
better privacy-utility tradeoff than existing solutions. The cross-
dataset evaluations on CelebA and LFW shows the transferability
of TIPRDC, indicating the practicability of proposed framework.
REFERENCES
[1] Brendan Avent, Aleksandra Korolova, David Zeber, Torgeir Hovden, and Ben-
jamin Livshits. 2017. {BLENDER}: Enabling local searchwith a hybrid differential
privacy model. In 26th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 17).
747–764.
[2] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. 2014. Neural ma-
chine translation by jointly learning to align and translate. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1409.0473 (2014).
[3] Raef Bassily and Adam Smith. 2015. Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct
histograms. In Proceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory
of computing. 127–135.
[4] Su Lin Blodgett, Lisa Green, and Brendan O’Connor. 2016. Demographic dialectal
variation in social media: A case study of African-American English. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1608.08868 (2016).
[5] Jia Deng,Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. 2009. Imagenet:
A large-scale hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. Ieee, 248–255.
[6] Alexey Dosovitskiy and Thomas Brox. 2016. Generating images with perceptual
similarity metrics based on deep networks. In Advances in neural information
processing systems. 658–666.
[7] Alexey Dosovitskiy and Thomas Brox. 2016. Inverting visual representations
with convolutional networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. 4829–4837.
[8] John C Duchi, Michael I Jordan, and Martin J Wainwright. 2013. Local privacy
and statistical minimax rates. In 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science. IEEE, 429–438.
[9] Úlfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. 2014. Rappor: Random-
ized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response. In Proceedings of the 2014
ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security. 1054–1067.
[10] Ran Gilad-Bachrach, Nathan Dowlin, Kim Laine, Kristin Lauter, Michael Naehrig,
and John Wernsing. 2016. Cryptonets: Applying neural networks to encrypted
data with high throughput and accuracy. In International Conference on Machine
Learning. 201–210.
[11] Google. 2018. Data Preparation. https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/docs/
tensorflow/data-prep.
[12] Google. 2018. Google Now Launcher. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_
Now.
[13] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. 770–778.
[14] R Devon Hjelm, Alex Fedorov, Samuel Lavoie-Marchildon, Karan Grewal, Phil
Bachman, Adam Trischler, and Yoshua Bengio. 2018. Learning deep represen-
tations by mutual information estimation and maximization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1808.06670 (2018).
[15] Tae-hoonKim, Dongmin Kang, Kari Pulli, and JonghyunChoi. 2019. Trainingwith
the invisibles: Obfuscating images to share safely for learning visual recognition
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.00098 (2019).
[16] Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. 2014. Adam: A Method for Stochastic Opti-
mization. arXiv.org (Dec. 2014), arXiv:1412.6980. arXiv:cs.LG/1412.6980
[17] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. 2012. Imagenet classifica-
tion with deep convolutional neural networks. In Advances in neural information
processing systems. 1097–1105.
[18] Neeraj Kumar, Alexander C Berg, Peter N Belhumeur, and Shree K Nayar. 2009.
Attribute and simile classifiers for face verification. In 2009 IEEE 12th International
Conference on Computer Vision. IEEE, 365–372.
[19] Ang Li, Jiayi Guo, Huanrui Yang, and Yiran Chen. 2019. Deepobfuscator: Ad-
versarial training framework for privacy-preserving image classification. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1909.04126 (2019).
[20] Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian. 2007. t-closeness:
Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity. In 2007 IEEE 23rd International
Conference on Data Engineering. IEEE, 106–115.
[21] Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva
Ramanan, Piotr Dollár, and C Lawrence Zitnick. 2014. Microsoft coco: Common
objects in context. In European conference on computer vision. Springer, 740–755.
[22] Sicong Liu, Junzhao Du, Anshumali Shrivastava, and Lin Zhong. 2019. Privacy
Adversarial Network: Representation Learning for Mobile Data Privacy. Proceed-
ings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 3, 4
(2019), 1–18.
[23] Ziwei Liu, Ping Luo, XiaogangWang, and Xiaoou Tang. 2015. Deep Learning Face
Attributes in the Wild. In Proceedings of International Conference on Computer
Vision (ICCV).
[24] Aravindh Mahendran and Andrea Vedaldi. 2015. Understanding deep image rep-
resentations by inverting them. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. 5188–5196.
[25] Sebastian Nowozin, Botond Cseke, and Ryota Tomioka. 2016. f-gan: Training gen-
erative neural samplers using variational divergence minimization. In Advances
in neural information processing systems. 271–279.
[26] Seong Joon Oh, Rodrigo Benenson, Mario Fritz, and Bernt Schiele. 2016. Faceless
person recognition: Privacy implications in social media. In European Conference
on Computer Vision. Springer, 19–35.
[27] Seong Joon Oh, Mario Fritz, and Bernt Schiele. 2017. Adversarial image perturba-
tion for privacy protection a game theory perspective. In 2017 IEEE International
Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV). IEEE, 1491–1500.
[28] Aaron van den Oord, Sander Dieleman, Heiga Zen, Karen Simonyan, Oriol
Vinyals, Alex Graves, Nal Kalchbrenner, Andrew Senior, and Koray Kavukcuoglu.
2016. Wavenet: A generative model for raw audio. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.03499
(2016).
[29] Seyed Ali Osia, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Sina Sajadmanesh, Ali Taheri, Kleomenis
Katevas, Hamid R Rabiee, Nicholas D Lane, and Hamed Haddadi. 2020. A hybrid
deep learning architecture for privacy-preserving mobile analytics. IEEE Internet
of Things Journal (2020).
[30] Nicolas Papernot, Shuang Song, Ilya Mironov, Ananth Raghunathan, Kunal Tal-
war, and Úlfar Erlingsson. 2018. Scalable private learning with pate. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.08908 (2018).
[31] Xue Bin Peng, Angjoo Kanazawa, Sam Toyer, Pieter Abbeel, and Sergey Levine.
2018. Variational discriminator bottleneck: Improving imitation learning, inverse
rl, and gans by constraining information flow. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.00821
(2018).
[32] Francesco Pittaluga, Sanjeev Koppal, and Ayan Chakrabarti. 2019. Learning
privacy preserving encodings through adversarial training. In 2019 IEEE Winter
Conference on Applications of Computer Vision (WACV). IEEE, 791–799.
[33] Zhan Qin, Yin Yang, Ting Yu, Issa Khalil, Xiaokui Xiao, and Kui Ren. 2016.
Heavy hitter estimation over set-valued data with local differential privacy. In
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. 192–203.
[34] Adam Smith, Abhradeep Thakurta, and Jalaj Upadhyay. 2017. Is interaction
necessary for distributed private learning?. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 58–77.
[35] Jiaming Song, Pratyusha Kalluri, Aditya Grover, Shengjia Zhao, and Stefano
Ermon. 2018. Learning controllable fair representations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.04218 (2018).
[36] Latanya Sweeney. 2002. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. Inter-
national Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 10, 05
(2002), 557–570.
[37] Stacey Truex, Nathalie Baracaldo, Ali Anwar, Thomas Steinke, Heiko Ludwig, Rui
Zhang, and Yi Zhou. 2019. A hybrid approach to privacy-preserving federated
learning. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security. 1–11.
[38] Tianhao Wang, Jeremiah Blocki, Ninghui Li, and Somesh Jha. 2017. Locally dif-
ferentially private protocols for frequency estimation. In 26th {USENIX} Security
Symposium ({USENIX} Security 17). 729–745.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Ang Li1 , Yixiao Duan2 , Huanrui Yang1 , Yiran Chen1 , Jianlei Yang2
[39] Thomas Winkler, Adám Erdélyi, and Bernhard Rinner. 2014. TrustEYE. M4: pro-
tecting the sensorâĂŤnot the camera. In 2014 11th IEEE International Conference
on Advanced Video and Signal Based Surveillance (AVSS). IEEE, 159–164.
[40] Yonghui Wu, Mike Schuster, Zhifeng Chen, Quoc V Le, Mohammad Norouzi,
Wolfgang Macherey, Maxim Krikun, Yuan Cao, Qin Gao, Klaus Macherey, et al.
2016. Google’s neural machine translation system: Bridging the gap between
human and machine translation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.08144 (2016).
[41] Zhenyu Wu, Zhangyang Wang, Zhaowen Wang, and Hailin Jin. 2018. Towards
privacy-preserving visual recognition via adversarial training: A pilot study. In
Proceedings of the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). 606–624.
[42] Ryo Yonetani, Vishnu Naresh Boddeti, Kris M Kitani, and Yoichi Sato. 2017.
Privacy-preserving visual learning using doubly permuted homomorphic en-
cryption. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision.
2040–2050.
